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ABSTRACT
This thesis attempts to answer the question of "How to
salvage distressed real estate properties?"
The thesis arrives at the following conclusions: the
existence of distressed property loans can be traced to the
historical cyclicality of the real estate development
industry; the entry of highly-liquid, undermanaged and
newly-deregulated financial institutions into the real estate
development industry; the artificial stimulus to investment
provided by the tax laws; and macroeconomic changes.
The problems faced by distressed properties are caused by a
lack of market demand due to forseeable circumstances such as
unsophisticated market analysis or inattention to demand, and
unforseeable changes in demand during the development period.
Alternatively, property distress may result from financial,
marketing or property management factors.
Financial restructuring of properties must secure adequate
time and money for a turnaround. Time is required for the
property to be absorbed by the market, to be renovated or
repositioned. Money buys time. The equity investor wields
significant negotiating power in distressed property
acquisition and refinancing due to his willingness to accept
risk. In exchange for investment of equity funds, the lender
may provide forbearances. Specialized mortgage instruments
such as the cash flow mortgage can be structured to suit the
particular needs of the distressed property.
Marketing strategies for distressed properties rely heavily
upon product repositioning; competitive pricing and broker
relations. Property management works in tandem with the
marketing strategy in maintaining cash flow during the
recovery period and securing new tenants.
Thesis supervisor: Lawrence S. Bacow
Title: Associate Professor
Urban Studies and Planning
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CHAPTER ONE :
THE FORCES WHICH CREATED ONE OF THE LARGEST PEACETIME LOSSES
OF CAPITAL IN U.S. HISTORY
Why are real estate markets across the United States replete
with vacant real estate projects of every kind? Why do
states, from Florida to California and Alaska to Hawaii,
report an oversupply of apartments, office buildings, retail
shopping plazas, hotels and many other types of property?
The reasons are complex and indicative of the tremendous
changes to which real estate and real estate capital markets
have been subjected in recent years.
The scale of losses attributable to distressed real estate is
illustrated by the frailty of the savings and loan industry,
a major source of capital for the real estate development.
The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation ("the
FSLIC") is on the verge of bankruptcy [1]. The FSLIC has a
negative net worth of $6 billion and loses $10 million per
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day. Proposals for a recapitalization of between $5 and $15
billion are currently before the Congress [2]. The FSLIC has
assumed control of 44 savings and loans, with total assets
exceeding $49 billion (3]. More than 450 savings and loans
are technically insolvent. Some industry experts estimate
that savings and loans may require $25 billion in capital
infusions during coming years, in order to survive (4].
Since 1982, banks and savings and loans have reported over
$10 billion in real estate-related losses (5]. Not all of
lender's loan problems are traceable to real estate. Many
suffered from ill-fated loans to the energy and agriculture
sectors. Yet, the total amount of non-performing, reposessed
or delinquent real estate loans held by commercial banks and
savings and loans as of March 1986 exceeded $60 billion [6].
The upheaval in real estate can be traced to four main
reasons: the historically cyclical nature of the real estate
development industry; the over-supply of capital and uneven
quality of management expertise at newly-deregulated lending
institutions; the stimulus to investment offered by the
availability of tax deductions for the ownership of real
property; and economic shifts, on both a regional and
macroeconomic level.
Cyclical Nature of the Real Estate Development Industry
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The real estate industry has historically been plagued with a
"boom and bust" mentality. The United States real estate
market is the only market in the world where the majority of
building takes place in anticipation of future demand, rather
than to fulfill existing demand. Developers respond to a
perceived demand for a certain type of real estate. They
tend to initiate projects with insufficient regard to
competition from potential new projects. Supply of certain
types of real estate is more price-elastic than demand. For
a given a change in price, developers tend to offer
proportionately more space on the market than consumers
demand [7]. Projects tend to feature long "lead" times
between project initiation and project completion.
Circumstances such as competitive supply can change
significantly during these lead times. This phenomenon is
often referred to as the "pipeline" effect. For these
reasons, supply of real estate can exceed demand. The result
is "overbuilt" markets. Excess supply of real estate can
take months, or years, to be absorbed by a market, imposing
significant carrying costs on owners. As space is gradually
absorbed, and vacancy rates go down and rents increase,
developers inititate new projects. The cycle of markets
attempting to return to equilibrium begins anew. Real estate
is an industry in continuous disequilibrum. [8]
PAGE 7
$1,330,000
$1,200.000
$1,100,000
$1,C00,000
$900,000
$800,000
$700,000
$600,000
$500,000
$400,000
$300,000
$200,000
$100,000
WORKOUTS BY PROPERTY TYPE
FEDERAL ASSET DISPOSITION ASSOCIATION
(152)
APTS FESID LAND OFFICE HOTEL INDUST RETAIL MXD OTHER
TYPE OF PROPERTY (NUMBER OF PROPERTIES)
Source: Federal Asset Disposition Association,
as of July 10, 1987. Data are for
"Participation Loans", those loans with a
minimum prinicipal amount of $2 million which
involve an institution in receivership or in the
govenment's Management Consignment ProgramSome
workout loans may be attributable to
difficulties encountered by the lending
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Savings and Loan Managers Venture into Real Estate
Development
Prior to 1980, the real estate industry moved in seven-year
cycles. The financial system provided a measure of
discipline to the industry. Federal government intervention
("Regulation Q") limited the rate of interest payable on
depositor's savings and loan accounts. As interest rates
rose, depositors withdrew their funds to place them in other,
higher-yielding financial instruments ("disintermediation").
Disintermediation reduced funds available for lending. When
this happened, lenders' underwriting criteria became more
conservative. The resulting reduction in the supply of
credit would limit new development. Reduced development lead
to a reduction in the supply of excess space [9]. This
pattern has been forever altered by the deregulation of
financial institutions (Depository Institutions Deregulation
and Monetary Control Act, "DIDMCA", of 1980). Financial
institutions of every type (commercial banks, savings and
loan associations, insurance companies and pension funds) now
compete for savings. These institutions operate on the
difference between their cost of funds and their interest
income, (the "spread"). As the institutions' cost of funds
rise, they must earn higher yields on their capital.
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Frequently, institutions have become equity investors in
projects in order to satisy their need for higher yields.
Thus, deregulation contributed to a flood of capital into the
real estate industry in the early 1980's, particularly into
the development of new property. As new capital competed for
real estate development projects in which to invest, supply
of space inevitably outstripped demand.
One of the more notable effects of DIDMCA was the
unprecedented influx of capital into real estate development
from the savings and loan industry ("thrifts") [10]. The
traditional expertise of thrifts lay in the the financing of
the nation's housing production and ownership. Prior to
1980, regulation and tax incentives combined to keep the vast
majority of thrift assets (loans) in residential mortgages.
With the elimination of these incentives, savings and loans
ventured into the lucrative, but risky, commercial lending
arena. Thrifts enjoyed a competitive advantage against
commercial banks due to their ability to make loans without
requiring a downpayment. Moreover, federal policy encouraged
the conversion of mutual savings banks into stock
corporations. This conversion had the desired effect of
increasing thrifts' capital. It also had the unintended
effect of massively increasing liquidity, because each dollar
of thrift capital could be leveraged into $30 of assets [11].
Additional liquidity emanated from the development of the
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mortgage-backed security. Mortgage-backed securities allowed
thrifts the opportunity to liquidate their existing
portfolios of single-family mortgages onto the secondary
market, thus making reserves available with which to fund new
loans. As a result, thrifts became more aggressive in
pursuing deposits and lending to commercial projects [11).
Unfortunately, the transition from residential to commercial
lending was not accompanied by a concomitant increase in the
supply of managerial talent with expertise in commercial
lending. The transition occurred virtually overnight for
thousands of thrift institutions across the country.
Managerial staff tended to be compensated on the basis of
fees generated by loan production. Earnings and stock prices
of financial institutions were determined by their ability to
secure fees from loan commmitments. While fees provide an
observable measure of performance, the quality of loans made
is much more difficult for outside investors to determine.
Further exacerbating the situation was the lack of real
incentives on the part of depositors to contol the managerial
excesses of thrifts. The lack of risk associated with
FSLIC-insured deposits allowed depositors to seek out the
highest yields without regard to safety. Savings and loan
associations negotiated equity interests in projects.
Lenders evaluated properties with an ownership mindset,
tending to be more willing to invest depositors' savings in
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risky projects. Management made decisions to commit funds to
often ill-conceived projects, with predictable results [12].
When thrift managers reached for a source of reassurance for
their ill-fated decisions, in the sea of commercial lending
uncertainty, the appraisal industry was often there. As many
as 25% of the 3,200 federally insured savings and loan
associations suffered from faulty appraisals between 1983 and
1985 [13]. The appraisal industry tolerated imprecise rules
governing the valuation of proposed projects and the varying
competency level of the many thousands who hold themselves
out as "appraisers". Cases involving the preparation of
fraudulent appraisals lead to a further erosion in appraisal
industry credibility.
Economic Recovery and Tax Act (ERTA) of 1981
The Internal Revenue Code has historically provided a
non-economic stimulus to real estate investment. The code
effectively subsidized financial returns from real estate by
permitting paper losses from real estate investment to be
used to shelter ordinary income from other sources. Tax
benefits were created through deductions for interest
payments made on non-recourse real property loans,
accelerated depreciation of buildings, and income tax credits
for investment in certain types of property. This subsidy
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made many otherwise-marginal development projects attractive.
As investors exploited the rules, another stimulus was added
for supply to outpace demand (14].
Sponsors of real estate limited partnerships ("real estate
syndicators") quickly organized to exploit the increased tax
benefits offered by ERTA in 1981. The real estate
syndication industry grew from $1.5 billion in placements in
1979 to over $10 billion in 1984 [15]. The most popular
vehicle for distributing tax benefits from ownership of real
property is the limited partnership, which allows complete
passthrough of tax benefits to the partners. The syndicator
would acquire a property and distribute the benefits through
the limited partnership vehicle. With the use of this
subsidy, the syndicator was able to offer often unheard-of
prices for real property. Builders and lenders eyed these
tax benefits and initiated projects which might otherwise
have been marginal, on a pre-tax basis. The market became
driven by the ability to sell the product rather than the
user's demand for occupancy.
Macroeconomic and Regional Shifts
Real estate has been affected by changes that were difficult
to forsee, in both the macro economy and some regional
economies. Inflation, which had ravaged the United States
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economy during recent years, was being treated as a permanent
element of the U.S. economy. The general expectation was
that inflation would continue. In net terms, real estate
tends to benefit from unanticipated inflation. The benefit
to real estate is due to increases in rents which increase
the value of property. Many real estate executives reasoned
that increases in the value of their property would proceed
unabated, along with inflation. They reasoned that real
estate loans would be supported by increasing rents and high
values. Moreover, future principal and interest payments
would be made in less-expensive, inflation-ravaged dollars.
As supply expanded, demand nationally grew less quickly.
Certain regions have actually experienced deflation and a
reduction in demand for real estate. The reduction in demand
for space was most prevalent in regions dependent on oil and
gas or suffering economic downturns in undiversified
economies. The office sector benefited from a rapid shift
from assembly-oriented manufacturing plants to office
buildings in the 1970's and early 1980's. Reduced growth in
demand for office space has reflected a slowdown in this
shift. The unforseen reduction in demand left projects
wanting for tenants.
The number of distressed properties would be much greater,
were it not for a reduction in nominal interest rates. The
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prime lending rate has gone from a peak of 21 percent in
January of 1981 to 8.25 percent in July of 1987 [16].
Summary
The multi-billion dollar loss of capital facing United States
lending institutions was brought about by the historial
cyclicality of the U.S. real estate industry; the entry of
highly-liquid, undermanaged savings and loans into the
industry; the stimulus to investment offered by tax
incentives; and macro-economic shifts. As supply of real
estate exceeds demand and projects are unable to pay their
debts, who pays the price? The dangerously simplistic
assumption is that the financial institutions absorb all
losses. It is society which ultimately pays for massive loan
losses. Banks and thrifts can absorb losses representing
only a small fraction of their assets before they reach
insolvency. Insolvent banks and thrifts leave their failed
real estate projects in the hands of government insurance
agencies, resulting in large, ongoing taxpayer subsidy.
Insolvency creates burdens and risks for thousands of
depositors, investors and employees.
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The failure of real estate projects also tends to exercise
downward pressure on property values in the localities of the
failed projects. An unsuccessful project in an area lends a
stigma to the neighborhood. The failed project can also
taint the market for similar properties.
This thesis will explore strategies for salvaging distressed
properties. The methodology followed includes interviews
with industry experts in an attempt to determine the
immediate cause of failure of particular properties. A
typology of problems affecting distressed properties is
developed. The thesis describes a range of strategies for
salvaging properties employing financial, marketing and
property management skills. Case histories are analysed to
determine how distressed properties are created and how
stategies can be implemented.
For the reader's convenience, the male pronoun will be used
throughout the thesis to indicate both male and female gender
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of the subject. The thesis adopts the perspective of the new
investor in distressed properties. The investor is assumed
to not have been instrumental in the development of the
distressed property. The names of the participants and facts
related to the case studies have been changed, where
requested by those involved.
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CHAPTER TWO: TYPOLOGY OF PROBLEMS FACING DiZ4AZIEDU
PROPERTIES
A distressed property ("workout") is a property which is in
default on the terms of the loan which it secures. Default
is frequently occassioned by nonpayment of principal and
interest.
Upon default, the lender may use its lien against a property
to bring about foreclosure for lack of contractual
compliance. Foreclosure results in an offering of the
property for sale to the public. The lender may bid for and
purchase the property. If proceeds of the foreclosure sale
are insufficient to satisfy other lenders, more junior liens
against the property are eliminated. Bankruptcy offers a
haven for debtors, in that it forestalls action by the
lender. Bankruptcy may be used to stay a foreclosure.
Alternatively, a borrower may voluntarily offer to the lender
or a third party a deed in lieu of foreclosure, forfeiting
PAGE 21
the rights of ownership. [1]
Workouts result either when a property suffers from
insufficient demand or when reasons unrelated to demand bring
about property distress.
I.Market Demand
Insufficient demand may result from forseeable circumstances
such as inadequate market analysis during project planning or
excessive optimism; or from an unforseeable change in the
market during the development process [2]. Lack of market
orientation is often manifested in such symptoms as
inappropriate design, poor choice of location, or pricing
above what the market will bear.
Market studies with significant shortcomings are often used
to justify the decision to develop a property. Distressed
properties often lack a proven market need. Market studies
frequently focus either on supply or demand, resulting in a
one-sided analysis. They rely upon trendline forecasts,
which ignore the existence of short- and long-term economic
cycles and their effect on real estate. Trendline forecasts
fail to adequately consider the structure of the local
economy. Local market areas are often treated in market
analysis as though they were independent of the metropolitan
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area of which they are an integral part. Inadequate
consideration is given to the importance of location by
failing to study potential acceptance of the project and its
competitors by consumers through spatial preference studies.
In analyzing supply, consideration is rarely given to
competition from potential, as-yet unannounced projects [3].
Errors of a procedural nature are also common in market
analyses. Such errors include inadequate consideration of
potential competition from subleases; inadequate scope of the
study; and use of erroneous information, such as employing
"asking" rather than "taking" rents, use of gross rather than
net absorption or use of poor comparables [4].
The developer and (or) the lender may choose to disregard
market demand. Excessive optimism of the sponsors of a
project is often related to their fee-based compensation.
Executives often have strong incentives to initiate a project
regardless of demand. When the developer earns a fee to
develop and the lender earns a fee to lend, there is little
incentive for restraint, particularly when the true
underlying capital risk is being borne by a federal insurance
agency.
Real estate projects may also suffer from unforseeable
adverse changes in the market during the long lag time
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between project initiation and completion. Demographic
changes, such as the closing of a military base in a town
with an undiversified economy, may reduce the demand for a
real estate product. Changes in lifestyle patterns or
macroeconomic factors reduce demand for space. The drop in
the price of oil significantly affected demand for real
estate in Texas, Louisianna, Oklahoma and Colorado. Economic
recessions in the Central and South American economies have
affected the demand for condominiums in South Florida. In
"steady state" circumstances, an appreciating dollar leads to
a marginal reduction in demand for real estate in markets
dependent upon foreign investment (5).
II. Other Factors
Distressed properties also result from financial, marketing
and property management considerations.
Financing
Insufficient demand or other adverse circumstances result in
the need to draw upon capital to survive an adjustment
period, until the property can become self-sustaining. Money
buys time. If capital is not available, the project runs out
of time and the property becomes distressed [6].
Insufficient capitalization is symptomatic of distressed
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properties. The financial structure underlying a project
often implicitly assumes stability or improvement in markets
over time. Contingencies are frequently not anticipated in
structuring financing. Developers frequently do not have
access to adequate capital resources with which to cover
contingencies. The financial institution approving a
construction loan may fail to adequately fund the project.
Lenders may naively underfund costs legitimately related to
the real estate development project. "Soft" costs such as
interest payment reserve, marketing costs and operating
deficits during the market absorption period may be
underfunded, in the name of "conservative" underwriting [7].
Lack of thoroughness or negligence in lender loan practices
and developer procedures may expose the institution, the
developer and the project to additional risks. The lender
may agree to fund a loan before all municipal and
environmental approvals necessary to legally develop the
property are in hand or before all appropriate consultant's
studies have been submitted and reviewed. The lender may
fail to verify that construction is proceeding on time and
within budget prior to disbursement of funds [8].
A real estate development project may be jeopardized by cost
overruns. Project complexity may exceed the developer's
construction monitoring capability. Costs may exceed budget
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for such reasons as a work stoppage by labor unions, problems
relating to soil conditions, significant change orders, an
increase in construction loan interest charges due to rise in
market interest rates or a contractor's inability to perform
for the agreed-upon price. Delays in project completion due
to securing of approvals, environmental permits or other
reasons may also exhaust capital resources. Securing of
approvals can result in delays of several months and can
result in the imposition of additional carrying costs on the
project [9).
Some distressed properties result from fraud or theft on the
part of one or more of the parties involved in the project.
A banker may accept bribes in exchange for influencing the
decision to lend on a project. A developer may employ
construction loan proceeds for purposes unrelated to the
project. A dishonest property owner may remove operating
revenues from the property, leaving inadequate funds with
which to meet debt service obligations [10].
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Marketing and Property Management
The developer may not have the requisite skills, staff or
experience or may be negligent with respect to accomplishing
crucial development tasks. The property may suffer from a
poor marketing effort during the market absorption period due
to inappropriate market positioning or inadequate use of
marketing channels. Property management may not be
responsive to tenant needs [11).
Occassionally, properties become entangled in difficulties
encountered by the lender and become workouts for reasons
unrelated to the property itself. The workout may result
from an inability or unwillingness of the lender to perform.
The institution may commit to a loan and then renege on its
commitment due to capital, corporate, merger, acquistion or
regulatory problems. Multiple lending institutions involved
in the loan participation may enter into a dispute which
causes the job to come to a halt. Alternatively, the
property may become distressed due to borrower violations of
agency restrictions in the credit agreement. Such violations
may include an insufficient current ratio on the borrower
balance sheet. The owner may cross-collateralize property,
resulting in foreclosure when some properties encounter
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difficulties. Tax reform may make investors indifferent to a
project, jeopardizing developer credit. Borrower problems
resulting in the creation of distressed property need not be
related to the property. Analysis of such "workouts" is
outside the scope of this thesis [12].
Summary
Distressed properties come into existence due to lack of
market demand for the space or problems associated with
financing, marketing or property management.
A distinction can be made between forces underlying the
creation of distressed properties which are forseeable and
those that not forseeable. We are more able to manage risks
for which some degree of advance knowledge exists. However,
real estate development is characterized by long "lead" times
for completion, complexity of construction, reliance on the
performance of diverse parties and other uncertainties. Not
all real estate-related risks are knowable in advance.
"Force Majeure" risks such as war, extraordinarily severe
weather, economic shifts and labor stoppages provide examples
of changes that are not forseeable. In "steady-state"
circumstances, these risks will always lead to a certain
number of workouts in the real estate industry. A certain
amount of risk is inherent in the real estate development
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process and helps to account for the above-average returns
generated by real estate development.
Finally, workouts are seldom brought about by the existence
of a single risk. Real estate casualties tend to result from
the convergence of a number of correlated risks. Careful
analysis of workout situations reveals that several
circumstances tend to converge in undermining the property,
with a particular circumstance often acting as catalyst [13].
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CHAPTER THREE :
PRINCIPLES OF
PROPERTIES
RESTRUCTURING FINANCING FOR DISTRESSED
Distressed property turnaround strategies involve a
combination of three basic elements: time; money; and skill.
The objective of the refinancing strategy is to secure time
and money for the property.
Time
Time is required in order for the property to be absorbed by
the market. Time is also needed in order to renovate or
reposition the property. The objective in structuring
distressed property transactions is to secure the maximum
amount of time within which to add value, at the lowest cost.
In this sense, financial structuring for distressed property
resembles a real estate option contract. At a given cost,
the longer the investor can control the property, the more
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likely he is to be vindicated in his belief that he will
profit due to property appreciation. The workout investor
seeks to harness the power of time [1].
Money buys time. Money is required to fund operating
deficits over the market absorption period, capital
improvements and to pay for marketing costs.
The workout investor's challenge is to secure additional
funds with which to buy time and salvage the property. The
additional funding must be secured in spite of a lack of
income from the property with which to make debt service
payments in the traditional manner.
Money
The incremental costs and expenses associated with salvaging
distessed properties must be anticipated in structuring
distressed property financing. Distressed properties may
require additional capital for renovation, operating deficits
and marketing costs [2].
The need for additional improvements to the property is
common in workouts. Distressed properties frequently require
renovation in order to satisfy a new market [3]. Owners of
properties on the verge of foreclosure have been known to
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massively substitute or delete materials in an effort to
avoid the loss of their property [4]. Unscrupulous borrowers
divert funds from their loans to other purposes. Costly
tenant improvement allowances may be required in order to
attract tenants [5].
A property with few tenants will nevertheless demand
substantial cash resources in order to cover operating
expenses. Occupancy of a property and operating expenses are
not well-correlated. A time lag exists between the point
where a tenant agrees to rent a space by signing a lease and
the point where he occupies the property and actually begins
to pay rent. Real estate taxes, insurance, maintenance and
other fixed expenses comprise a large share of total property
operating expenses for many properties and must be funded
regardless of the total occupancy level of the property [6].
Loss of tenants ("shakeout"), tends to occur in distressed
properties during the market absorption period. The loss of
existing tenants tends to prolong the market absorption
period and contribute to operating deficits. Tenants may be
lost due to dissatisfaction with the distressed property.
Tenants may be evicted due to the their loss of discipline in
meeting lease obligations [6].
Distressed properties demand extraordinary marketing
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expenditures in order to overcome a tainted reputation in the
marketplace. Marketing, promotional and property management
personnel costs are high for distressed properties relative
to other properties [6].
Funding for the extraordinary needs of a distressed property
is secured from a combination of equity funds, unsecured
loans, a purchase money mortgage, senior and junior
mortgages. Equity funds represent the most "patient" capital
in the financial structure. In contrast with debt, common
equity is not accompanied by a legal obligation to make
current interest payments.
Equity
The new equity investor wields significant bargaining power
in loan restructuring negotiations. The investor's
willingness to invest his capital toward resurrecting the
lender's troubled property represents a powerful negotiating
tool. The equity investor's bargaining power emanates from
his willingness to accept risk. Equity protects debt by
standing first at risk. New investment of equity allows the
existing debt to be restructured. Without new equity
investment, the lender owns the property. Without new
equity, the lender's loan on the property effectively becomes
the equity: it earns no current interest and is the first
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capital at risk.
The investor's negotiating objective is to secure lender
forebearances in the form of capital and time to contribute
toward the property's recovery. The investor is motivated by
an anticipation that markets with excess supply will
experience a reduction in construction. Should reduced
construction result in less supply being offered on the
market, prices would increase and he would stand to gain.
The investor will also benefit from tax benefits associated
with interest payment deductions and net operating losses
deductible against future income ("NOL carryforwards").
While the lender wishes to minimize a reduction in the amount
owed on the loan (the "writedown"), lender motivations are
not all financial. The lender may have regulatory, legal or
public relations motivations in concluding a transaction.
The lender may seek to bring about interest income from the
loan so as to be permitted to classify the loan as a
"performing" asset. The lender may seek to sell the property
within a specified time so as to satisfy regulatory
requirements. He may seek to salvage a distressed property
so as to avoid the glare of negative publicity [7].
Both the lender and the investor must render a judgement as
to whether their respective anticipated rewards from the
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property will justify their patience and investment of
capital over the holding period [8].
Debt
The second source of funds for the workout effort is the
existing lender. The lender may inject new loan funds into
the property. The property gains time to recover by shifting
existing loan repayment obligations from the present to the
future. Existing debt is converted into more patient,
quasi-equity capital. The lender may restructure existing
loan terms including the term, amortization and interest
payments.
The lender will resist reductions in the principal amount
owed. He will seek to structure a transaction which will
allow him to recover his investment. The loan repayment term
must be extended to provide adequate time for property
recovery. The investor will therefor seek to avoid mortgages
with a relatively short term, such as bullet loans. The term
may be extended for a fixed period or can become a function
of achievement of certain property performance levels, such
as a minimum loan-to-value ratio [9].
The investor seeks to restructure loan payment obligations to
coincide with realistic expectations of the property income
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stream and thereby avoid default. Concessions as to
amortization of principal have a relatively small impact on
current debt payments. If current interest payment
obligations exceed project income, equity reserves will
eventually vanish.
The interest rate ("pledge rate") and current coupon rate
need not be the same. The pledge rate can exceed the coupon
rate. The difference between the stated rate of interest and
current interest payment (the "pay rate" or "coupon") is
accrued. Reasonable care must be taken to avoid an excess of
interest accruals over project equity.
The viability of the project must not be threatened by
potential increases in variable interest rate payment
obligations. Rate sensitivity may be minimized by sharing
interest rate burdens with a joint venture partner; hedging
capital costs in the interest rate futures market; or setting
lower and upper boundaries on variable interest payment
obligations ("floors" and "caps") [10].
Other Loan Provisions
other issues likely to arise in loan negotiations include
participation or conversion rights and personal liability.
In exchange for concessions, the lender may request the right
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to participate in the proceeds of sale above the mortgage
amount, if any. Alternatively, the lender may seek to have
the right to convert his secured, debt interest in the
property into an equity postion.
Personal liability and cross-collateralization for loans on
distressed properties are avoided by investors.
Occassionally, guarantees may be offered on potential
property operating deficits, up to a specified amount [11].
The challenge facing the workout investor is to determine the
degree of reward which he must secure in order to justify his
investment in the risky project. The investor must also
assess what concessions he can secure from the lender.
ALTERNATIVE MORTGAGE INSTRUMENTS
By combining the above degrees of freedom, mortgage
instruments can be structured so as to answer the particular
needs of a distressed property.
Cash Flow Mortgage
The objective of the cash flow mortgage is to avoid borrower
default for non-payment of interest. The property pays debt
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service equivalent to available cash flow. Cash flow
mortgages have no pay rate. The difference between available
cash flow and the pledge rate accrues against the principal
amount. Thus, the loan principal amount may actually
increase from year to year ("negative amortization").
Alternative cash flow priorities may be arranged. The cash
flow from the property may be divided ("stripped") so as to
assure both the lender and investor a cash return out of
available cash flow.
An accrual-basis borrower may fully deduct interest
equivalent to the full pledge rate in computing his federal
income tax liability, if the lender recognizes equivalent
interest income (12) [13).
Accrual Mortgage
The accrual mortgage differs from the cash flow mortgage in
that the accrual mortgage features a coupon rate, creating a
fixed payment obligation. The cash flow mortgage pays
interest only if cash flow is available from operations
[14).
Zero Coupon Mortgage
The Zero-Coupon mortgage ("zero") is similar to an accrual
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mortgage, with a pay rate of zero. All interest on the zero
accrues and is compounded over time. The lender may demand a
premium over current market rates on a zero to compensate for
additional risk. Participation in the proceeds of sale above
the mortgage amount may be demanded, particularly if the zero
is subordinated to a more senior mortgage [14].
Participating Mortgage
The Participating Mortgage offers the borrower a below-market
rate of interest in exchange for a percentage of operating
income and (or) proceeds of sale above the mortgage amount
("residual value").
The benefits of the participating mortgage to the borrower
tend to be in the form of short-term cash-flow. The
participating mortgage becomes much less advantageous to the
borrower over time. At some point, interest payments become
equivalent to market rates at the time of mortgage
origination. Beyond this point, the project must make market
interest payments in addition to being obliged to surrender a
percentage of the residual [14].
Wrap-around Mortgage
The wrap-around mortgage is added to the existing mortgage on
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the property. It typically features a pledge rate which is
above the pledge rate on the existing mortgage and allows the
borrower to realize additional funds by borrowing on the
property. The lender profits from the difference in debt
service between the existing mortgage and the wraparound.
The wrap-around mortgage satisfies the borrowers' need for
additional financing and debt service relief [15].
Fixed and Variable-Rate Mortgages
The above mortgage instruments can be structured as either
fixed- or floating-rate instruments. The pay rate may be
staggered, beginning as low as zero and gradually moving
upward over time. Floating-rate interest payments can be
determined by a variety of indices. The intervals at which
the interest rate is to be adjusted and the maximum
adjustment in the rate between intervals and over the life of
the loan are negotiable [15).
A mortgage which combines features of the above instruments
may be employed with distressed properties. While the above
descriptions are meant to be illustrative, new instruments
are continually devised [16).
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The investor will optimize value from the transaction by
placing project benefits in the hands of those who value them
most. Parties to distressed property transactions have
different yet complimentary needs. Parties may differ with
respect to their federal income tax exposure, cost of funds,
measure of value (book vs. market), and risk preference.
For example, pension funds tend to be attracted to assets
whose returns correlate positively with inflation, to match
against their inflation-sensitive liabilities. They are
therefor interested in extending variable-rate mortgages and
in real estate equity investments [17].
Salvaging the Midland, TX Office Building
The financial restructuring of a distressed 50,000 sq. ft.
office building in downtown Midland, TX. illustrates a
strategy for providing both adequate capital to fund
operating deficits during the market absorption period and
time for recovery. The total project cost was $6,000,000 and
the developer secured $5,000,000 in takeout financing. With
an occupancy level below 50 percent, the property suffered
from a mismatch of revenues and expenses. The lender
foreclosed when the developer became unable to fund operating
deficits and capital costs. The workout investor developed a
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strategy for adding new "patient" capital to the property.
The new capital structure succeded in minimizing fixed
payments over the property holding period [19].
The investor determined that the property itself was
fundamentally sound. However, he was concerned about the
future availability of long-term funds in the capital
markets. The property was projected to generate cumulative
deficits of over $1,500,000 over a seven- year holding
period. How could the property be saved ?
In analysing the acquisition, the workout investor assumed
that increases in rental income would occur only due to
increased property occupancy and property upgrading. No
increases were assumed to occur for such other factors as
market improvement or inflation. The investor based his
decision to invest upon value, not on expectations as to
market improvement. Expenses were assumed to remain stable.
Leases on the building are "Triple Net", calling for full
passthrough of expense increases to the tenant. Debt service
payments on the existing first mortgage had to continue.
Capital Structure
The investor agreed to provide $500,000 in new equity funds
for the project. This amount represented the total
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investment to be made by the equity investor. These funds
were to be used to cover project operating deficits. The
lender initially requested that these funds be applied toward
principal amortization. The investor staunchly resisted this
request. The investor insisted that new funds be injected
into salvaging the distressed property, which ultimately
might enable the lender to achieve a return of capital. The
first mortgage continued to be fully serviced.
The lender agreed to fund a second mortgage of up to $500,000
above the investors' equity investment on a non-recourse
basis. The second mortgage proceeds were to be applied
toward tenant improvements on space which had not been
leased. Interest would be paid on the funds actually
disbursed.
Additionally, the lender agreed to make an amount of $750,000
available for further operating deficits and capital
improvements on an unsecured basis. Interest on the
unsecured loan was accrued. Interest payments and principal
amortization on these funds would be deferred for a
twenty-year term.
Recapitalization
All debt on the property would become due and payable at the
PAGE 46
end of the twenty-year term. The property would be
recapitalized with a new loan from the lender. The principal
amount of the new first mortgage loan will be the sum of the
$5,000,000 existing first mortgage loan, the $500,000 second
mortage loan and the principal and accrued interest on the
$750,000 loan. The new loan would be fully amortized over 29
years, with maximum annual interest payments not to exceed
$549,000 per year.
The structure allowed the loan on the Midland office building
to once again become a performing asset by generating
interest income. The lender avoided having to increase his
loan loss reserves to allow for a loan writeoff. Confidence
in the abilities of the investor was key to the lender's
willingness to disburse further funds on the property. The
prospect of significant future gains existed for the
investor. Should even a marginal improvement in the general
rent levels occur in the local marketplace, the property
would generate enormous gains. Adequate funds are available
to cover projected deficits during the market absorption
period. The structure assured the availability of permanent
loan proceeds in the future. The structure eliminated
concerns relating to interest rate risk upon refinancing. By
guaranteeing a maximum annual debt service payment in the
future, the investor hedged against future interest rate
risk. Caution was taken by the investor to assure that
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accrued interest and other loan obligations did not exceed
reasonable expectations of the future property value. The
investor always asks whether anticipated appreciation will be
adequate for the property to repay loans plus accrued
interest.
Summary
Distressed property turnaround strategies involve a
combination of three basic elements: time, money and skill.
The financial structure of a distressed property seeks to
provide adequate time and money resources with which to
salvage the property. The workout investor seeks to harness
the power of time so as to perform product renovation and
repostioning and achieve market absorption of the property.
Money buys time. Money is required to fund operating
deficits, marketing costs and renovation expenses. Equity
investors have significant bargaining power to negotiate
forbearances from the lender due to the investors'
willingness to accept risk. While the investor maitains the
flexibility of not becoming an owner of the distressed
property, the lender is the de facto owner of the distressed
property. Mortgage instruments can be structured to answer
the specific needs of distressed properties.
The investor seeks to structure an agreement which is
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predicated upon current revenue and expense figures (value),
rather than expectations of future performance [19].
There are threee determinants of the capital structure of a
transaction. This chapter has addressed the preferences of
the parties involved and the type of transaction. The
investor must also incorporate the status of the capital
markets into the analysis. In a volatile world, no optimal
capital structure for distressed properties exists. One must
monitor equity and debt pricing in the capital markets on a
daily basis to determine the best course of action (20].
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CHAPTER FOUR :
MARKETING STRATEGIES FOR DISTRESSED PROPERTY
Marketing efforts for distressed properties are more
intensive than those required of other properties. The
marketing strategy for distressed properties rests on the
premise that the property has typically has become known as a
troubled property in the marketplace. Successful distressed
property marketing relies upon positioning of the property to
suit an identified market need, competitive pricing and real
estate broker relations.
Product Repositioning
Real estate products that have failed to attract a market
often require repositioning. Product repositioning entails
orienting the product to address the needs of a group of
potential new users or to alter perceptions of the property
held be a group of existing users. The repositioning is
accomplished by effectively re-manufacturing the product to
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serve a new market. Additionally, a property may adopt a new
name so as to shed a negative market identity.
A comparative assessment must be performed of the distressed
property in relation to the local marketplace. Space
configuration, amenities, and other property attributes must
be compared with competitive -properties. For example,
distressed apartment complexes should be compared against
condominiums and single family homes, against which
apartments compete. The key elements in selling or renting
residential space are square footage and life-style.
Lifestyle is determined by the amenities and services offered
by the residential complex. Lifestyle considerations can
overcome price competition from other facilities [1].
Case Study: Is There a Doctor in the Area?:
Repositioning The Mid-Western Office Building
A professional office building in suburban Chicago, Illinois
illustrates the need to reposition the distressed real estate
product to meet a new market. A money-center bank made a
construction loan on a mid-size office building, the first
post-War office building proposed in the town. The
developer's concept was to attract tenants by asking
less-than-premium rents for first-class office space in a
suburb which lacked virtually any modern office buildings.
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The principal local employers were a university and hospital.
The developer proceeded to' develop the project without
sensitivity to the market, which did not feature an abundance
of potential users for conventional office space. Results of
the leasing effort were disappointing. Few tenants responded
to solicitations. The property was unable to meet debt
service obligations and the lender foreclosed. A specialist
in salvaging distressed property assessed the alternatives.
He identified a previously unrecognized source of demand:
medical professionals associated with the local university
hospital. A multi-million dollar refurbishment was performed
to meet the specialized needs of these professionals.
Floorplans previously designed for large users were
subdivided into many smaller offices for individual
physicians' use. Plumbing was extended to the new offices
and necessary individual washbasins were added to each.
Success was achieved by remanufacturing the product to serve
a newly redefined market need. The repositioned property was
fully leased.
Pricing
Competition becomes the key determinant in establishing rents
(or prices) for distressed properties. Project cost or total
indebtedness are relatively minor considerations in
determining pricing strategy. Unleased or unsold space in a
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market represents inventory. In a stagnant or declining
market, the key to salvaging distressed property becomes the
ability to lease or sell the existing inventory at current
rates. The rent structure of a distressed property must be
lower than that prevailing for comparable properties. Lower
rents provide an inducement for sale of the inventory.
Reductions in price can bring about a significant increase in
demand [2].
A major element of any leasing effort will be to retain
existing tenants. Aggressive rates may be offered in the
crucial effort to maintain an income stream from the
property. In some cases, existing leases are destroyed and
lower rents offered in exchange for extending the lease term.
Offering of equity in the project to tenants may be warranted
in some circumstances [3].
Competitor's costs are a key consideration in determining
competitive rent structure. If an exisiting competitor's
cost basis is lower than that of the investor in distressed
property, the competitor may potentially outbid the investor
for tenants. If future competitors can build a similar
product while incurring significantly lower costs of land and
construction, they will enjoy an advantage [4].
In structuring tenant inducements, the workout investor seeks
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to fulfill an unmet market need [5]. Tenant inducements may
be utilized to increase the property's competitive position.
Creativity can assist in meeting tenant needs while staying
within project budget. For example, distressed Texas
apartment complexes frequently offer travel and entertainment
inducements to renters. Travel and entertainment have the
disadvantage of offering an exhaustible, one-time-only
inducement to the tenant to sign a lease. Creative investors
in distressed Texas apartment complexes offer appliances such
as microwave ovens or fans. These permanent amenities enjoy
the advantage of being available as an inducement to both
current and future tenant prospects [6].
"Free rent" periods are generally avoided by experienced
workout investors. The correlation between receipt of free
rent and tenant default on lease obligations is noticeable.
Preference is given to structuring leases with a below-market
net effective rent [7].
Case Study: Rocky Mountain High:
Altering Pricing Structure for the Denver Office Building
The case of the suburban Denver office building serves to
illustrate the effectiveness of competitive pricing in
securing tenants. The 250,000 square foot "Town Square"
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office building owned by the State Employees' Pension Fund
was fully preleased upon construction in 1982 to creditworthy
petroleum concerns. A regional recession was subsequently
brought on by the precipitous drop in oil prices. As leases
expired, tenants closed or consolidated offices in new
locations. By 1986, the building lay entirely vacant.
The pension fund implemented a competitive pricing strategy
to re-lease the space. The strategy focused on securing a
major, anchor tenant who would add legitimacy to the building
in the local marketplace. A trained, full-time leasing agent
was hired to concentrate exclusively on the leasing of the
building. The agent identified a construction-services
company which occupied 125,000 square feet in a neighboring
building under a lease with two years until expiration and a
rental rate of $24.00. With comparable office space in the
depressed market leasing for $18.50, the agent structured an
offer calling for an initial rental rate of $17.00, on a
ten-year lease. The rental rate would "step-up" annually
beginning in year two, in increments of $1.00, until reaching
$26.00 in 1996. The insurance company would pay $3 million
toward the tenant's existing lease obligation. Signing a
lease with the construction services firm added significant
momentum to the leasing effort, making a simpler task of
securing other users. Smaller tenants were attracted to the
building over the course of the following nine months, at
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below-market rental rates. One half of the lease commission
was paid to brokers on the very day that the lease was
signed, with another half paid on the date of occupancy.
Competitive pricing succeeded in securing tenants for a
completely vacant building in a depressed, oil-dependent
region. The leasing effort resulted in an occupancy level in
excess of 90 percent.
Promotion
Marketers rely heavily on direct-contact promotional
practises in the extraordinary leasing effort required by
distressed properties. While traditional real estate media
campaigns employ signs, mail, newspapers, billboards, radio
and television advertisements, distressed property marketers
often -rely on telemarketing and canvassing competitive
buildings. A key link in the promotional effort for
distressed properties is the real estate broker.
Securing the support of the best people in the local real
estate brokerage community is the focus of the marketing
campaign. A fundamental marketing consideration is that of
"Who represents the product at the point of sale?" [8]. In
many markets, prospective tenants work with a real estate
broker (or "locator") who tends to specialize in certain
market niches. It is imperative that the leasing broker be
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an individual with established relationships with quality
tenants [9].
Frequent contact and meetings with brokers allow the investor
to maintain his property at the forefront of broker
awareness. Members of the brokerage community also respond
favorably to social events organized to increase awareness of
the property. Frequent contact also yields an opportunity to
secure market intelligence with which to maintain a
competitive rent structure. Continuous monitoring of
marketing results is important in attaining marketing
objectives. While brokers provide a valuable introduction to
prospective tenants, the workout investor must be
continuously, personally involved in the leasing process [9].
The workout investor can gain increased broker attention by
offering a commission structure in excess of market norms.
The procuring broker may receive a full commission, with the
cooperating broker receiving a half commission. Payment of
commissions is made promptly upon signing of the lease in
order to maximize broker cooperation. Sales and leasing
contests aimed at brokers can add a sense of urgency to
leasing campaigns and accelerate the market absorption
period. The workout investor may offer rewards in exchange
for procurement of a qualified tenant prospect requiring a
minimum amount of square feet within a set time period [9].
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A full-time leasing agent for the property can facilitate
prospective tenant identification. Market absorption can be
significantly augmented through intensive training of
professional personnel in management, leasing and selling
skills, such as showing space and closing lease transactions
[10).
Case Study: "Doing Things Big":
Auctioning Texas Condominiums
The auction of a 220 unit condominium complex illustrates how
creative approaches to promotion can achieve sales in an
inactive market. A savings and loan association funded the
construction of the "Las Brisas" condominium complex in
Houston in 1985. The developer sold 160 units. The regional
economy unforseeably deteriorated during the market
absorption period due to a drop in oil prices. Sales took
longer than anticipated. The developer came to believe that
the units could "not be sold" and promoted the units
ineffectively. The developer exhausted his capital. The
savings and loan foreclosed. A workout specialist was
brought in to implement a sales strategy.
The specialist planned an auction sale for the units. An
advertisement was placed prominently in the local newspaper
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With a total cost of sales equivalent to 4 percent of sales
proceeds, all 60 units were sold in one weekend, with another
90 "backup" contracts on hand.
Direct, creative promotion resulted in sales by creating a
sense of urgency. Peer pressure was created by the presence
of many other interested buyers, compelling visitors to make
on-the-spot offers. "Unsellable" condominium inventory in a
depressed real estate market was sold in its entirety in a
single weekend.
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Case Study: Miami Vice:
Repositioning and Competitive Pricing In the
Miami For-Sale Housing Market
The case of a Miami, Florida condominium complex illustrates
how a combination of competitive pricing and product
repositioning salvaged a foreclosed for-sale housing project.
An inexperienced developer constructed a 231 unit, 20-story
condominium complex on Miami's prestigious Brickell Avenue in
1975 with a construction loan from a Real Estate Investment
Trust. Despite a healthy local housing market, the developer
failed to secure significant sales. The project encountered
financial difficulties. The Real Estate Investment Trust
holding the construction loan foreclosed when construction
was approximately 85 percent complete. An outside workout
investor was brought in to propose a turnaround strategy for
the property. Should the property be sold in bulk to one
purchaser, resulting in a possible writedown for the REIT?
Or, could units be marketed individually, allowing the REIT
to recoup its investment? [11]
The investor's analysis revealed that the product was not
thoughtfully conceived. The condominium development offered
neither the space nor the lifestyle crucial to residential
real estate marketing. Units tended to be small in relation
to other properties on the market. The swimming pool had
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been constructed near the street and lacked any privacy. The
100 parking spaces were inadequate to serve the needs of 231
owners. Many condominium units had views on the parking lot.
Characteristically, the tennis court had been built with an
east/west orientation, in violation of the norms of the game.
Pricing of the units had created an inequality. With all
units priced similarly, units on upper floors with southern
exposure onto beautiful Biscayne Bay had sold first. Few
sales has occurred on sides of the building with
less-desirable exposure. Prices were high in comparison to
comparables.
In repositioning the property, the workout specialist added a
landscaped buffer between the swimming pool and the street.
He erected a parking superstructure over the existing parking
lot. He added a new tennis court with a north-south
orientation on top of the parking superstructure. Placement
of the attactively landscaped tennis court atop the parking
structure preserved space and simultaneously added attractive
views onto an amenity area for many condominium units.
New prices were established without relation to total project
cost or outstanding loan balance. Pricing strategy was
modified to offer an incentive to purchasers of units with
inland views. The incentive took the form of a $20,000 (10
PAGE 63
percent) price differential between bay- and inland- facing
units.
A previously-lacking lifestyle feature was added to the
marketing effort. An emphasis on recreation and the outdoors
life permitted the condominium to be marketed as a community
offering a "club" lifestyle. Recreational features and
amenities were accentuated. The emphasis on the outdoors
tended to de-emphasize the small size of the condominium
units.
Initial construction of the project had cost $14 million.
The refurbishment effort cost $3 million. With gross sale
proceeds exceeding $21 million, the lender realized a profit
of $4 million. Competitive pricing and a remanufactured
product succeded in revitalizing the property.
Property Management
Property management efforts work in tandem with the marketing
repositioning strategy. Property management is instrumental
in bringing about additional revenues through tenant
retention. Clean, neat buidings are important in securing
new tenants and maintaining existing tenants. Maintaining
tenants preserves property cash flow and thereby offers the
property additional time to recover. The property manager in
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a distressed property turnaround serves to maintain the
physical appeal of the property, to initiate a
tenant-relations campaign and to build community acceptance
of the distressed property [12].
The property management firm can significantly reduce
property operating expenses by appealing real estate tax
assessments and concentrating occupancy of buildings.
Buildings purchased at a significant discount or with
below-market financing can appeal to the real estate tax
assessor to base the assessment on the purchase price rather
than on the original cost. Property managers can control
where space in a facility is occupied. By concentrating
partial tenancy in certain parts of the property, other parts
can be closed, reducing occupancy costs [12].
A successful property management strategy for distressed
property relies on the choice of quality property managers.
The investor's objective must be to secure the best property
management staff available. Professional, aggressive,
market-oriented younger property management and leasing firms
with experience in workouts are the most appropriate [13].
Owner involvement in monitoring and overseeing the property
management effort should be continuous and intensive.
Distressed property turnarounds require quality
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upper-mamagement time. Management requirements are typically
traceable to physical defects of the property and to
eradicating possible problems with tenants. Management of a
distressed property can demand two to three times the
management attention required by a conventional property,
over an extended time period [14).
The investor in distressed property should not accept the
open-ended financial responsibility of completing
construction. The nature and degree of the work involved in
completing a project is unpredictable and costly. Even the
most experienced construction executive cannot accurately
predict the construction requirements of a
partially-constructed project. The original lender must
agree to accept an open-ended financial commitment with
respect to completion of construction. Inspection of the
property prior to acquisition is advisable. Developers may
go to great lengths to conceal omissions and substitutions of
materials [14].
The combination of a management and leasing team is most
appropriate for a distressed property. Leasing agents tend
to have a relatively short-term interest in the tenant and
the property. Once compensated for securing a lease, they
can quickly loose interest in a tenant. By combining the
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property management and leasing functions, leasing agents
gain the long-term perspective of the property managers.
Combining leasing and property management also permits a
cross-subsidization, with substanitial leasing commissions
helping to compensate for more meager management fees.
Management and leasing firms are often offered incentive
compensation when managing distressed properties, with
above-average fees paid for attaining results in tenant
retention and leasing [15].
SUMMARY
Successful distressed property marketing relies upon
positioning of the property to suit an identified market
need, competitive pricing and real estate broker relations.
Property management works in tandem with marketing in
achieving a property turnaround.
The individual investor in distressed properties has an
organizational advantage over institutional holders of
competitive properties. The individual can move more swiftly
and can make creative decisions independently, rather than
await the approval of committee. This flexibility acts to
counteract the institutional advantage of capital [12].
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CHAPTER FIVE:
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The multi-billion dollar loss of capital facing United States
lending institutions was brought about by the historical
cyclicality of the U.S. real estate industry; the entry of
highly-liquid, under-managed savings and loans into the
commercial real estate industry; the stimulus to investment
offered by tax incentives; and macro-economic shifts.
Distressed properties come into existence due to either
inadequate demand for the product or due to risks associated
with financing, marketing and property management.
Inadequate demand may be traceable to unsophisticated market
analysis, inattention to demand considerations, or a change
in demand during the development period.
A distinction can be made between forces underlying the
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creation of distressed properties which are forseeable and
those that are not forseeable. We are more able to manage
risks for which we have some degree of advance knowledge. In
"steady-state" circumstances, these risks will always lead to
a certain number of workouts in the real estate industry.
Real estate casualties tend to result from the convergence
of a number of contributing reasons.
Distressed property turnaround strategies involve a
combination of three basic elements: time, money and skill.
The financial structure of a distressed property seeks to
provide adequate time and money resources with which to
salvage the property. Time is needed for repositioning of
the property and renovation. Money buys time. It funds
operating deficits and costs associated with product
repositioning such as tenant improvements and 'renovation.
The equity investor has negotiating leverage in structuring
financing due to his willingness to assume risk in order to
salvage the lender's property. Specialized mortgages answer
the particular needs of distressed properties. In a volatile
world, no optimal capital structure for distressed properties
exists. one must monitor equity and debt pricing in the
capital markets on a daily basis.
Successful distressed property marketing relies upon
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positioning of the property to suit an identified market
need, competitive pricing and real estate broker relations.
Product repositioning in the marketplace essentially amounts
to remanufacturing the property. Property management and
marketing interact in achieving a successful property
turnaround. Property management increases tenant retention,
improves the image of the property in the community and
reduces operating expenses. Property management is dependent
upon the selection of quality managers. However, there is no
substitute for direct, continuous owner involvement.
The individual investor in distressed properties has an
organizational advantage over institutional holders of
competitive properties. The individual can move more swiftly
and can make creative decisions independently, rather than
await the approval of committee. This flexibility acts to
counteract the institutional advantage of capital.
Ultimately, workout strategies are not radically different
from strategies for well-managed development of successful
properties: structuring financing to realistically match the
anticipated property operating income; positioning the
property in the market to serve an existing market need at an
achievable price; promoting the property aggressively through
marketing channels, particularly the brokerage community; and
employing professional, motivated property management aimed
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at tenant service, all coordinated by the intense, personal
involvement of the owner. The property that was not
effectively developed initially must, in essence, be
re-developed correctly by the workout specialist.
Many opportunities exist in this sector for the disciplined,
skillful investor who allies himself with patient capital.
PAGE 73
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INTERVIEWS
Interview with Samuel Zell, Chairman, Equity Financial and
Management Company, Chicago, Illinois, June 1987
Interview with Sandy Shkolnik, Vice President, Equity
Financial and Management Company, Chicago, Illinois, June
1987
Interview with Larry Levey, Chief Financial Officer, Hall
Financial Group, Inc.,Dallas, Texas., July 1987
Interview with Eduardo R. Arellano, Vice President,
Senior Corp., Miami, Fl., June 1987
Interview with Jim Bertelsen, Asset Disposition Group,
Continental Illinois National Bank, June 1987
Interview with Teri Dunham, Editor, Value Retail News,
July, 1987
Interview with Nicholas Katsoulis, Vice President, Chemical
Bank Real Estate Group, July 1987
Interview with Daria Plasitella, Chemical Bank Real Estate
Group, New York, July 1987
Interview with Emanuel Sperantsas, President, Cosdem
Investments, New York, July 1987
Interview with Jennifer Bergen, Chemical Bank Real
Estate Group, June 1987
Interview with Jack B. Sangunett, President, Sangunett and
Associates, Alexandria, Virginia, June 1987
Interview with Robert Nessen, Attorney, Fine and Ambrogne,
Boston, Massachusetts, June 1987
Interview with Duke Woodward, Wayne Duddlesten Inc.,
Houston, Texas, June 1987
Interview with Marc A. Louargand, Visiting Associate
Professor, Urban Studies and Planning, Center for Real Estate
Development, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, July 1987
PAGE 74
Interview with Andy Siwulec, Senior Vice President
York Associates, Bethesda, MD., July, 1987
Interview with Mark Jennings, Workout Loan Specialist
Oldstone Bank, Oldstone Development Corporation, Providence,
R.I., June 1987
Interview with Richard Scott, Principal, Aldrich, Eastman and
Waltch, July 1987
Interview with John Chapman, International Council of
Shopping Centers, June 1987
Interview with Warden Rinehard, President, First State
Savings and Loan Association of Orlando, Orlando, FL., June
1987
Interview with Steve Carp, President, New England
Development, June 1987
Interview with Ed Morris III, Bank of Boston, Boston,
Massachusetts.
Interview with Michael Buckley, President, Halcyon Ltd,
Hartford, Connecticut.
Interview with Jim Bulloch, Vice President, Citibank N.A.,
New York, N.Y.
Anonymous Interviewee, Real Estate Workout Specialist, June
1987
Interview with Bob Irvin, Chief Executive Officer, Collier
Financial Holding Company, Naples, Florida, July 1987
Interview with Val W. Ballard, Senior Financial Analyst,
Federal Asset Disposition Association, Washington, D.C.
LITERATURE
"The Wrap-Around Mortgage...Friend or UFO", Francis P.
Gunning, Real Estate Review
"Empty Buildings: Severe Deflation Hits Commercial Properties
in Many Areas of the United States", Wall Street Journal,
September 4, 1986
"The Grave Dancer", Samuel Zell, Real Estate Review
"The Return of the Grave Dancer", Samuel Zell, Real Estate
PAGE 75
Issues, Fall/Winter 1984
"Hall American Center Associates (Corporate Newsletter)",
"Hall Olivetree Associates", Hall Financial Group, Dallas,
Texas, June 30, 1986
"I Hope I Never See Another Boom", Interview with Kenneth
Schnitzer, Forbes, September 23, 1985
"Troubled Properties For Some Are Opportunities for Others",
Wall Street Journal, April 8, 1987
"Real Estate Syndicator's Shift", Profile of Arthur J.
Halleran, Chairman, Winthrop Financial, The New York Times,
June 25, 1987
"How the White House Lost Its Big Bank Battle", The New York
Times, July 12, 1987
"Pru Sells Joint Ventures to Boost Real Estate Portfolio",
U.S. Real Estate Week, July 6, 1987
"Loose Lending: Texas Savings and Loan Disasters are blamed,
in part, on Freewheeling Style", Wall Street Journal, July
13, 1987
"A chat with Michael Milken" Forbes, July 3, 1987
"Troubled Real Estate: The Federal Government's Solution",
James D. Noteware, The Journal of Real Estate Development,
Spring.1987
"The Wright Man to See", Newsweek, June 29, 1987
"Malpractise in Real Estate", Forbes, June 29, 1985
LECTURES AND SEMINARS
"Financing Real Estate Under Tax Reform", seminar conducted
at Center for Real Estate Development, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, by Robert Nessen, Attorney, Fine and
Ambrogne, Boston, Mass.
"Real Estate Market Outlook", John McMahan, McMahan
Associates, San Francisco, California, Lecture at Center for
Real Estate Development, M.I.T., Fall, 1987
"Market Analysis for Real Estate (Lecture Notes)", graduate
level course offered by Professor William Wheaton, Center for
Real Estate Development, M.I.T.
PAGE 76
"Structuring Complex Real Estate Transactions (Lecture
Notes)", graduate level course offered by Professor Lawrence
S. Bacow, Center for Real Estate Development, M.I.T.
"Structuring Complex Real Estate Transactions", Arthur J.
Halleran, Chairman, Winthrop Financial Associates, Lecture
Series delivered at Center for Real Estate Development,
M.I.T.
TEXTS
"The Workout Game: Managing Non-Performing Real Estate
Assets", Stuart M. Bloch, Esq., Executive Enterprises
Publications Co., New York.
PAGE 77
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
The author, Costas (Dean) Sperantsas, attended Georgetown
University in Washington, D.C., graduating with honors in
Finance and Economics in 1982. Upon graduation, he was
employed by the New York investment banking firm of Morgan
Stanley & Co., in the real estate division. He later was
engaged in multifamily and industrial development in Florida.
He has published articles on real estate topics in English
and Greek.
The author intends to devote time, as principal, to working
out distressed properties.
PAGE 78
